It is generally believed that the concept of citizenship is basically found on a classical ideal, that was introduced to the modern world by the two civilizations of the ancient times: Greeks and Romans. The classical conception of citizenship offers us conceptual dichotomy of citizenship forms: differentiating between "active" ? and "passive" ? conceptions of a citizen.

It's explained from the historical point of view by the following. Small Ancient Greek state-cities, or polis were not the examples of high and complex political organization, that's why Greek ideal of citizenship can be connected with moral, personal, cultural good of every member of the small community of the polis. While the complicity and high organization of the public power and government in Roman Empire assumed another conception and approach to the ideal of citizenship, which was seen from a more juridical background and more official perspective.

These first similar concepts of the ideal citizenship later were spitted into two different concepts of active and passive citizenship. Active citizenship not just accepts the common good of the society and common values of the society, but also includes public participation in the life of the society, combining the private and individual world of a human and his public participation, stating that human can only fulfill his potentials in the social life. Passive citizenship basically differs by another approach to the social life participation. But the very core of the citizenship institute are it's functions: administrative and legislative, which guarantee harmonic and protected development of the society and social values as human life, property, liberties, etc.

The concept of human's nature expressed consists primary of self-interest and abilities for competition individualism. Such authors as Jones and Marshall who represent different trends of citizenship theories, the first is the supporter of the ideal citizenship, while the other one is the supporter of social citizenship, still they both respond to the core of the ideal citizenship and individualism.

The idealist conception of citizenship exactly answers to the basics of "active citizenship" ?. Commenting Edward Urwick and R.H.Tawney, Harris makes the point that each of them 'believed that good social relationships were inherently personal, that virtuous people and good citizens rather than well-contrived policies were the indispensable prerequisites of a well-ordered state, and that society was rooted in a reality that was ultimately transcendental'. 30

The bond that was made between 'virtuous people and good citizens', and 'a well-ordered state', responds to the central place of individual and private ethics to the public order. It's significant that putting of "people" ? above "well-contrived policies" ?, one more time explains that the state was made for the sake of people, for the sake of their protection and personal growth, that is universal good as well.

Jones rejected any distinctions between the state and the citizen and considered them to be a "false dualism" ?. To his belief, state's perfection and moral condition primary depended upon the level of citizenship: the will and personality of the citizen defined the formation of the state and it's future development and policies. The only way to the improvement of the society was personal and individual development and growth of its citizens. To Jones point of view, human nature is social, rational and is in constant development in ethical consciousness.

That's why citizenship was not only referred to political or legal categories, but was also considered to be a state of mind and being. So the only realization of the human as a part of the state system was seen in his participation in social life. This was the way by which the active citizenship operated in the idealist point of view. With the introduction of mass democracy and social protection as well as introduction of welfare state there appeared a need in the new conception that would look on the relationship on an individual and the state.

By the words of Michael Ignatieff, the introduction of the welfare state can be explained as an attempt to make citizenship 'a real as opposed to a purely formal experience'. The experience of World War Two, showed that the concept has to be changed and since then the 'security' became of the main value for the new conception of citizenship. Civic solidarity had to be built on the principles of 'presumption that the more a citizen received from the state the more easily he would connect his private interest to the public'. 31

In this context, conception of citizenship, introduced by Marshall, may be seen as one that closely approximates passive citizenship, although he differentiates between three elements in its development.

The civil element answered for 'the rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice' and generally reflected the concepts of passive citizenship.

But Marshall, also included, as a 'political element': 'the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a 'body' and a 'social element': rights which range from economic welfare to 'the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society'.

For Marshall's point of view, the fullest realization of citizenship was primarily dependent on a liberal-democratic welfare state, that guaranteed essential civil, political, and social rights to all members of the state.

The idea of equality and equal citizenship goes all the way to the Aristotle's political philosophy and his ideas and thoughts that citizens of the state have top rule and be ruled. (Politics: 1252a16) In modern societies, this concept has been changed and overseen, and is introduced by the development of representative government and democratic elections. (Manin: 1997) For nowadays liberal thought, in contast, citizenship isn't seen as a matter of having equal opportunities in governance, but it's mostly a legal status that guarantees and provides with certain rights that are rights of voice, vote, and of a zone of private autonomy. The other feature of liberasism that differenciates it from other political theories is the wider range of the human that claim to have essential rights both that protect them and guarantee their social participation in public life. Modern theory of liberalism is more expanded than any other political theories that existed years before.

It is generally believed that sexism and racism were of the main critique on liberalism through the twentieth century. But still, two important liberal ideas made possible an internal critics of sexism, racism and other forms of social hierarchy. The first idea is that society is formed and organized by humans, that it is a product of human will, but not a result of God's will or super-natural powers. The second idea states that social agreements and decidions have to be justified by reason to each human who obeys them and who is able to reason. The combination of these concepts made possible an egalitarianism, which hadn't existed in earlier societies.

Still nowadays many theorists consider that acceptance of liberal egalitarianism demands from the liberal state the seeking of a program of constant changes of informal social norms and modern popular culture. They state that social stereotypes still act strongly to deny equal citizenship to such groups as blacks, women, and homosexuals. For example, Kernohan made an arguement that "the egalitarian liberal state should play an activist role in cultural reform." ? (1998: xi), and Koppelman supported his position: "the antidiscrimination project seeks to reconstruct social reality to eliminate or marginalize the shared meanings, practices and institutions that unjustifiably single out certain groups of citizens for stigma and disadvantage." ?(1996: 8) This position strongly contradicts with some of the ideas that support the third-generation civil rights.

A cultural-reconstruction stage of the civil rights movement would be contrary to Kukathas's idea that it is quite dangerous to allow the state to act against cultures that engage in social tyranny.(2001) It also given the soil for further questions about whether cultural reconstruction supported by the government would break basic liberties, among which are freedom of private association for example. The attempts of New Jersey to use antidiscrimination law to the Boy Scouts, a group that make discriminations against homosexuals, pictures the potential problems. The Supreme Court rejected those efforts, justifying it by the freedom of association. (Boys Scouts v. Dale) Nevertheless, it can be needed to change the limits of some basic freedoms if the concept of free and equal citizenship is followed to its logical conclusion. Social participation has been the underlying specialization for civic republicans who discuss concepts of active citizenship, and the value that participation in the political life brings to the individuals (Barber 1984; Mouffe 1992; Kymlicka & Norman 1994; Bussemaker & Voet 1998:284; Oldfield 1998). Civic republicans consider the participation in decision-making processes by the possible majority of citizens to be the ideal form of democracy. The basic feature of the civic republican approach to citizenship is in following: the citizens ought to be directly involved in politics, because of their civic duty to act for the good of themselves and society.

It "holds that political life - the life of a citizen - is not only the most inclusive, but also the highest form of human living together that most individuals can aspire to" ? (Oldfield 1998: 79). Benjamin Barber describes practice of participation by following words: "literally it is self government by citizens rather than representative government in the name of citizens" ? (Barber 1984: 151). Barber states that activities like neighbourhood assemblies, town meetings, civics education and the use of national referendums or elections will assist in the realisation of civic republicanism's idea of active citizenship (1984: 261-312).

In addition to all this civic republicans objectively distinguish between public and private sphere of social life in a hierarchical way. It's to be more specific, true participation and fulfilling of duties that can only be found in the world of public politics; the private life of individuals is quite an obstacle, a negative force on public life. These concepts of civic republicanism are spoiled because participation can be only an ideal since few people, and specifically few women, are able to participate in political activities because of lack of access, background, education, or simply of lack interest to the ability to participate. These existing contradictions are not the subject of finding solutions for the theorists of civic republicanism.

Alternative to civic republicanism, communitarian approach to citizenship argues, that citizens are not dispersed individuals, but each of them is the unit of a community, in which their status and t participation is formed through their constant dependence on other members of community. The relations therefore define participation, that citizens have with each other and with the communities, where they are the members. Communitarians oppose the liberal concepts of citizenship because of their basis in determining the autonomous individual as self-sufficient and one who derives rights from this status.

Communitarians insist that liberalism with its individualist outlook "overlooks the differences and material inequalities between members of society and pays too little attention to the social dimension of citizenship" ? (Bussemaker & Voet 1998: 289). Communitarianism and civic republicanism, concentrate on the politics of the 'common good' (see Winter 2000: 30-31). Yet they are different in the following: for communitarians, citizens are seen as members of communities, rather than as individual public figures as they are viewed by the supporters of civic republicanism. Communitarians focus on common values and norms, and on people's "duties" ?as being citizens (Bussemaker & Voet 1998: 290). They focus on family life, traditional moral values and traditional ways of caring (Kane 2000: 220-1). Communitarians, to the other hand, highlight the transferring of private virtues and norms into the public decision-making sector of life, which again shows a fundamental difference with civic republicanism.

Civil society is seen as essential in improvement of day-to-day life, and civil society organizations are seen to replace the role and responsibilities of government authorities in ensuring the rights related with social citizenship. The civil society organizations that are discussed from this approach are seem to be local neighbourhoods, working environment, school communities or families; by the list can also include such kind of organizations as women's organizations, sports associations, as well as volunteer workers in community service (see Putnam 1995). The tasks of the governments basically lie in the establishment of the conditions that would stimulate citizens to take responsibility for their social surroundings (Latham 2001: 240-242).

"Neither paid work through the market or political participation, as constructed through, and facilitated by, the state, is able to impart these particular moral positions. Instead it is the imperative of a separate sphere of civil society, constituted by voluntary, self governing associations of citizens" ? (Kane 2000: 219; Kymlicka & Norman 1994: 363; however, see Cox and Caldwell 2000: 65-7 for a more ambivalent position on the role of the state; also see Lyons 2001: 189 on the role of non-profits).

The ideas of communitarianism have been widely used in recent discussions because of the importance of creating 'social capital'. Social capital has a relation with the processes between people who establish networks; norms and social trust and contribute to the coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. Social capital is considered to appear in communities and is been a subject of argument that "social capital should be the pre-eminent and most valued form of capital as it provides the basis on which we can build a truly civil society" ? (Cox 1995: 17). Robert Putnam, the sociologist who popularised the concept of social capital, distinguishes between political participation and social capital. To his opinion political participation is considered narrowly as "relations with political institutions" ? (1995: 665), and is seen as social capital and its complementary act of "civic engagement" ? seem to be more suitable official descriptions for acts accepted by members of communities (1995: 665-7). Debates have appeared from a fear that society has already lost trust and confidence, has already lost the development of social capital and a sense of community (for Australia research see Davis 2001: 220-224; Hogan and Owen 2000).

Discussions on the theme of social capital bring as the result to a redirection of the debates about citizen's rights and duties, and so move away from the topic of liberal and civic republican points of view. In communitarianism it is 'community' responsibility to establish and fulfil participation and practice of citizenship. In this case the state no longer takes this role, or it's not seen as citizen action undertaken in the political, public sphere generally (see Turnbull and Fattore 1999: 235; Everingham 1999). Most probably it is "trusting" ? and sharing communities that are able to provide for citizenship by constant providing and guaranteeing the social rights of individuals, because the impulse or willingness to participate is forecasted on undertaking caring for, and with, other members of community.

Iris Marion Young rejects liberalism concepts, explaining her choice that liberalism privileges the seeking of private interests and that's why results in the depoliticization of public life. She supports civic humanists who point on Rousseau to call for a rebuilt public sphere; "freedom lies in participation in genuine public discussion and in collective decision-making" ?(Young 1990, p.116). But at the same time, she also supports feminist critics of liberalism principles as the main point in her criticism of the universalism, which is common both to civic humanism and liberalism.

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"The deontological tradition of moral reasoning which generates the universalism of modern political theory must be rejected because the unity it produces in the public sphere is achieved only by excluding differences to the private sphere" ? (p.98). For the realization of the universal citizenship, on Young's 1204 Kate Nash account, there should be present mechanisms for representation of groups' experiences in the political process. The concept lies in the participation of representatives from the groups of citizens in the public life, and proposing their own ideas and decisions from their own experiences and to put veto on the ideas of the others who may affect their own ideas (pp.121-9). Young, after that, opposes the universalities of recent liberal democracy to the 'true' universalities of groups distinguished representative democracy. But how far would her propaganda of the accepting the difference avoid the problem of essentialism?

She definitely notes, that a group should not be seen as something with some specific, fixed set of features or attributes. But it isn't easy to see groups in any other way if democracy involves established institutionalised mechanisms of representation of groups. To make a decision what groups should be represented, a specific set of features has to be defined as a measure of including group members and excluding non-members. Young gives some of the possible criteria: group members should be in disadvantage in terms of their discrimination,etc. These criteria are not well defined and it is not understandably clear how groups can be distinguished in these terms but what she suggests, is that women may be considered to be such a group.

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She seems here to be assuming that there are certain types of experiences, interests and values that all women have in common when it is definitely what has been questioned under the name of anti-essentialism. In anti-essentialist terms, identities are changing, different and term 'women' does not define a group, or a set of similar individuals who share a certain type of characteristics; rather it constructs its referent, a group that is identified in a particular context. It doesn't mean that there is no possible group of 'women' with which all featured individuals identified as women would identify. They may, for example make commof identification as the sex that has been discriminated. But this kind of identification would be truthfully very abstract or quite a rare and would not justify introducing mechanisms by means of which the group 'women' could be represented in a democratic way. It looks possible that the setting of mechanisms for representation of women as a group, can also function to establish the constituency they were set up to be. But this is also a dilemma for anti-essentialist feminists for whom feminism is asocial movement that has a purpose in eliminating gender differences as far as it is possible, or at least at freeing from sexual difference.

The main point was to determine citizenship as both status and practical realization, with the two elements that interact in a dynamic relationship through the notion of human institute. The introduction of the two main traditions that derived citizenship as status and practice was informed by the concept of inclusiveness. This concept was later applied to the realization of citizenship worldwide. For the former, it pointed on the possibilities of universal establishments of citizenship as a part of a diverse, international concept that unties and weaks citizenship's ties with the nation-state also creating on the discourse of human rights. Within nation-states, the concepts of distinguished universalism were introduced as a mean of including the tension between difference and the universalism that stands at the centre of citizenship. It was later used to citizenship both as a practical realization and a status by means of a discussion of solidarity politics and the specializing of rights while obtaining the concepts of universalism and equality.

These general basements provided the foundation for discussing the more concrete question of women's claims to citizenship. The concept of distinguished universalism was applied to a number of basic debates in feminist theory in trying to move beyond the binary divides which so often involve us into either a gender-neutral or a gender-differentiated models of citizenship, neither of which can be satisfactory its own. Thus, it doesn't remain to be a question of having to opt for a demand to full citizenship, that is based on either women's equality with or difference from men, encouraged by an ethic of either justice or care; that is premised on an ideal of either the independent or interdependent citizen.

Changed and modified along feminist and radical pluralist lines, citizenship gives a theoretical tool that contributes to the analysis of the pressures and tensions that continue to face women in their diversity, without denying women's agency. As an instrument or measure, it also offers a political potential to be realized. So the possibilities given by citizenship can be a great power for self-realization in the society even for the minority groups that feel different types of discrimination toward themselves, because the rights that guarantee them equality assume the wide range of social and public participation.

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